The term "empire" is a concept commonly used in contemporary China, albeit with somewhat vague connotations. Having an emperor doesn't automatically qualify a state as an "empire." Historical records show that China has never functioned as an empire and its various governing systems or policies are fundamentally different from empire domination.

In popular culture, literature, the arts, and academic circles, it's not uncommon to refer to the prosperous periods of ancient Chinese dynasties as "empires." However, it's essential to recognize that the term "empire" is a foreign concept, and its meaning has evolved. While ancient Chinese texts during the Sui Dynasty (581–618) did use a term resembling "empire," it referred to a country ruled by an emperor. However, this is not equivalent to the modern understanding of the term "empire."

The modern concept of empire in China was influenced by the Japanese language's use of Chinese characters. When the Japanese translated the Western term "empire," they employed the Chinese characters "帝国," which then made its way to China. However, in the late Qing Dynasty (1616–1911), Chinese scholar Yan Fu didn't consider this concept identical to the ancient Chinese understanding of an empire. He cautiously used the transliteration to convey the notion of an empire.

In recent times, some Chinese scholars have combined the notions of imperial rule and empire, referring to powerful ancient Chinese dynasties as empires. Consequently, in popular culture, the term "empire" has become synonymous with these influential dynasties. Nevertheless, its connotations differ from both the classical definition of an empire in Chinese texts and the Western concept of an "empire."

This nuanced understanding provides clarity on why it may not be entirely appropriate to label dynasties like Qin (221–206 BC), Han (206 BC–AD 220), Tang (618–907), and Qing as empires, despite their historical significance.

Does having an empire depend on having an emperor?

The term "empire" in international discussions holds a historical and political significance that is somewhat different from the presence of an emperor or an imperial system. In the realm of global affairs, "empire" denotes a specific and rather nuanced concept.

Joseph Colomer, a prominent Spanish political scientist, elaborated on four fundamental characteristics of empires in a paper presented at Oxford in 2017:

1. Size Beyond Nations: Empires are expansive, extending far beyond the scope of a typical nation.

2. Flexible Borders: Unlike nations, empires typically lack fixed or permanent borders.

3. Complex Territorial Structure: Empires comprise diverse groups and territorial units with asymmetrical relationships to the center of power.

4. Multi-Tiered Jurisdiction: They often have overlapping and multi-tiered structures of governance.

It is important to understand that an "empire" is not a mere synonym for a nation or a state. While empires can encompass nations within their domains, they are driven by a different set of principles.

The concept of empire has profoundly impacted global history, particularly in the Western world. From the vast dominions of ancient empires like Rome and Alexander's, to the more recent imperial aspirations of European powers, the idea of empire is intertwined with conquest, expansion, exploitation, cultural assimilation, and more. It goes beyond the existence of an emperor; instead, it is a reflection of a particular form of governance characterized by a central power structure ruling over a diverse array of conquered territories and peoples.

The governance structure of the Roman Empire centered around the Senate, which appointed governors to oversee conquered territories, primarily to extract wealth from these regions. During the later period of the Roman Empire (particularly by the 3rd century AD), the number of provinces exceeded one hundred. Although provincial governors were appointed by the Senate, they enjoyed a high degree of independence. The status of a governor in a province was comparable to that of a local ruler, wielding extensive powers, including the highest judicial authority. Even if a governor committed serious misconduct, the Senate could not remove him from office during his tenure; he could only be tried after completing his term and returning to Rome.

In the later period of the Roman Empire, although conquered populations were allowed to apply for Roman citizenship, the imperial governance structure remained largely unchanged, and the empire lacked significant internal cohesion. The governance framework of the Roman Empire was fundamentally different from the prefecture-county system established by the Qin and Han dynasties in China during the same period, and it also diverged from the typical governance models of kingdoms.

In summary, "empire" carries a distinct meaning, one that involves connotations of colonization, conquest, expansion, subjugation, economic dominance, enforced cultural export, the binary worldview of either conformity or coercion, and more.

Did China ever function as an empire in its history?

If we understand an empire as a conquest system comprising a sovereign power and the territories it has conquered, then China has never truly been an empire. While the Qin Dynasty unified China into a centralized state, and its ruler Qin Shihuang declared himself an "emperor," the resultant centralized nation is not synonymous with the concept of an empire.

China adopted a system where provinces were ruled vertically by the central authority with a county structure. All officials were appointed by the imperial court, and there was no notion of delegated management.

China's ancient political structure was such that "the affairs lie in the four directions, but the control remains at the center, and wise leaders direct their power from the center, prompting the effectiveness of all regions." After the Qin Dynasty's conquest of six states, China was divided into thirty-six prefectures and counties, with a central government that didn't consist of representatives from regions but rather divided regions according to its own design.

In this structure, the central authority preceded the local governance both logically and chronologically. All powers of governance were derived from the center, and localities held no inherent authority. Prefectures and counties were essentially executive branches of the central authority. The central power over local areas was articulated as "like limbs controlled by the body, and like fingers directed by the hand." Consequently, there has never been a genuine notion of an empire in China's history.

Concurrently, ancient Chinese civilization played a significant role in promoting internal cohesion within its vast unified nation. This civilization had an immense cultural appeal that attracted and combined various surrounding ethnic groups. Post-Han Dynasty, the ethnic and cultural integration is often cited as a driving factor behind internal cohesion within the Chinese nation. This process fundamentally differs from the dynamics of typical empires, which often encompassed diverse and heterogeneous cultures, leading to a lack of internal cohesion.

In summary, within Western political discourse and academic language, an empire represents a conquest system where both the central and subordinate regions are considered constituent parts. Thus, referring to China's powerful ancient dynasties as empires implies that China, during those periods, was a conquest-driven system.

Some Western scholars occasionally refer to China's Qing Dynasty as an empire, arguing that the Qing's domain was a multi-layered system that subjugated various territories and ethnic groups. According to this viewpoint, regions and ethnic groups within Qing's territory were temporarily ruled by the Qing Dynasty through military force. Applying this concept implies that after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, some of these regions should have gained independence. This perspective underscores the importance of not labeling China as an empire during the Qing Dynasty and underscores both a theoretical and practical concern.

Was the Jimi system in ancient China the same as the Western Empire domination?

Historically, China's state structure seems to have resembled Western empires in some respects. In the history of China after the Qin and Han dynasties, the Chinese imperial court sometimes ruled the border areas loosely, and in some cases it did not exercise direct rule but a kind of indirect rule. For example, the Jimi system (or a loose-reign system), the system of tusi (土司), was widely practiced in remote areas of China. If ancient China was not an empire, how can we understand the similarities between this state structure and that of an empire?

China's state construction is based on a set of political ideologies, theories, and a political faith, which is the concept of great unity. Personally, I believe that the fundamental difference lies in the fact that China's concept of great unity is completely incompatible with the imperial ideology.

This idea came mainly from Legalism and Confucianism, although the two most influential schools of thought in ancient China often debated with each other. China's system since the Qin Dynasty has been based on "outwardly Confucianism while inwardly Legalism," with the basic framework and institutions of the state following the principles of Legalism. This was manifested in the centralized county system which was known as the "Qin's political system influenced all subsequent dynasties." On the other hand, Confucianism has provided society with the ethical and moral norms that govern human relations, including the relationship between ruler and ministers.

There is indeed a practical problem. In ancient times, due to low productivity—factors such as the level of material development, infrastructure and transport tools were all underdeveloped, it was indeed difficult for the central authority to impose a unified vertical rule over a vast territory. For example, in ancient China's political centers, it would take several months to travel from Yunnan or Guizhou to the capital, such as Chang'an, Luoyang and Beijing. However, after the Qin and Han dynasties, the concept of great unity had become a consensus between Confucianism and Legalism. Therefore, from the Qin and Han periods, a new system —the Jimi system—was used to administer the border regions. Jimi system is a special type of administrative system enforced by Tang and Song (960–1279) areas where hereditary tribal rulers receive duties from the central court while keeping the high degree of autonomy.

The Jimi system was a stopgap measure. When the central government was unable to exercise direct rule, it could temporarily grant autonomy to the Jimi regions, similar to how empires ruled conquered territories. Following the Yuan Dynasty (1206–1368), the tusi system was implemented. The frontier regions allowed for self-governance, as long as they paid tribute and serve the imperial court.

So, does this mean that the Jimi system and tusi system are the same as the empire domination? In fact, there are significant differences. The idea of a unified and centralized state has been deeply ingrained in China since the Qin and Han dynasties. Due to practical constraints, at times, the central government granted significant autonomy to local regions. However, this autonomy was by no means inherent to the local regions. Because the source of law and authority resided with the central government, it had the power to reclaim these rights when conditions were deemed appropriate, such as the historical reform of the tusi system by integrating tusi into the rotating official system starting from the Yuan Dynasty. The concept of a unified state has become intrinsic to both rulers and the scholar-official class in China, forming the core of Chinese political culture.

Therefore, for more than 2,000 years, the Jimi system and tusi system in China was a complement to the centralized system of great unity, in which the central government unified all the border areas through a set of complicated and elaborate system.

The author is Han Zhu, the Director of the Shangdao Institute of Social Research, Research Fellow at China Research Institute of Fudan University.

Liu Xian /Editor    Li Minjie /Translator

Yang Xinhua /Chief Editor    Liu Xian /Coordination Editor

Liu Li /Reviewer

Zhang Weiwei /Copyeditor    Tan Yujie /Image Editor

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