After half a year of shuttle diplomacy, mediation, consultation and coordination among all the parties concerned, the second round of six-party talks on the Korean nuclear issue will be held at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on February 25. Jin Linbo, an international relations expert with the China Institute of International Studies, under the Chinese Foreign Ministry, offers an informed opinion.

"This second round of talks will be different to the first round last August, also held in Beijing. Then the different parties set out their various positions on the nuclear issue. In the second round what is needed is for all the parties concerned to show good faith and reach a written agreement on matters of principle. However, since Washington and Pyongyang have taken quite different stances on the nuclear issue and Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) both have their own separate proposals, the new round of talks will not be easy," said Jin.

Can consensus in principle lead to a joint statement?

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi is China's chief negotiator at the talks. At a press conference on August 29, 2003 following the first round of six-party talks, he said that the six parties had reached a six-point consensus on the Korean nuclear issue. All parties concerned agreed to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful means and dialogue and were of the view that dialogue should continue in order to establish trust, reduce differences and broaden common ground.

Nevertheless, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had reservations about the six-point consensus. Before leaving Beijing they expressed the view that there was no need to re-open the talks.

China is hopeful that the consensus reached so far might go on to be formalized in writing. Jin is cautiously optimistic about whether a joint statement on this matter will result from the fresh round of talks.

In addition, Jin said that the six-party talks should be "institutionalized" to facilitate a final settlement of the nuclear issue being achieved within a reasonably firm timetable. To achieve this goal, the parties concerned may set up liaison groups to maintain contacts in the longer term.

"Institutionalization" would represent a relatively rigorous form of agreement. Consensus at the conference table would go on to be set out in the form of a treaty or agreement to be subsequently ratified by the legislative bodies of each of the individual nations before taking effect.

Will the EU join in the talks?

"As early as the first round of six-party talks, the DPRK indicated its wish to have the European Union (EU) involved in the nuclear negotiations," Jin said. "At the same time the EU in general and Germany and Switzerland in particular, were stepping up their efforts in diplomatic mediation, trying to play more significant roles in ending the Korean nuclear standoff. Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey visited Pyongyang and Seoul from May 16 to 23, 2003. This made clear that nation's position of wishing to have a say in the nuclear issue."

"The DPRK would like to see the EU at the conference table to place a constraint on the United States. The EU on its part would wish to have a greater say in world affairs while taking the opportunity to promote its economic interests in Asia, "Jin said.

"In terms of the Iran nuclear crisis, France and Germany helped to find a mutually satisfactory resolution. By joining in the Korean nuclear talks, the EU would be able to increase its influence in Asia while significantly increasing its international reputation," he added.

According to Jin's analysis, the EU has indicated to the DPRK that it would not only be interested in joining the talks but in becoming involved in future economic cooperation in the region.

"If the DPRK were to adopt a reform and opening-up policy following the Chinese model, then the US and Japan, which are currently so vigorously involved in the nuclear issue, would surely be well placed to participate in the country's economic development. So joining in the talks is a practical way for the EU to position itself for a slice of this cake," Jin said.

Will the US change its strategy?

Since the nuclear crisis emerged on the Korean Peninsula, the concessions made by the DPRK are there for all to see, while the US has adopted a rigid attitude. While occasionally appearing ready to compromise, the US has however not actually changed its position on any matters of principle.

Jin is of the view that the US does have room for maneuver on the Korean nuclear issue but is not anxious for a quick solution. On the other hand the DPRK can't afford to get bogged down in long drawn out negotiations and at the same time is endeavouring to secure economic gains at each step.

Jin points out that the Korean nuclear crisis does not pose a direct threat to the US as the DPRK's nuclear weapons are well out of range of US territory.

"Even if the DPRK were to actually launch its missiles, the US military base in the Pacific Ocean could react promptly. The main threat that concerns the US is that of nuclear proliferation and the options it has available to address this are not limited to peaceful talks. The US could wear the DPRK down by prolonged economic and military blockades," said Jin adding, "For DPRK, there is little space for maneuver and it has nothing to gain by putting up a desperate struggle."

"The DPRK wants to improve its relations with the US and if possible also with its neighboring countries. However it is currently facing the problem that the US has branded it as part of a so-called axis of evil," Jin said.

Jin predicts that the cumulative effect of all these factors will see the US make technical adjustments to its strategy. For example, once the DPRK had frozen its nuclear development, the US could provide DPRK with heavy oil, then conduct nuclear inspections on DPRK territory and finally establish diplomatic relations. In this way, the US might respond positively to substantial concessions by the DPRK. This would be helpful to President George W. Bush in a presidential election year. However the US cannot be expected to make any concessions on matters of principle that would be disadvantageous to Bush's presidential election campaign. Meanwhile, the DPRK must make some substantial concessions otherwise it will be difficult for the six-party talks to go much further.

China, Japan, ROK and Russia each have their own ideas

China, Japan, ROK and Russia each have their own ideas to bring to the six-party talks. The position taken by Japan is closest to that of the US however the Japanese side would also like the talks to resolve their long-running issue of kidnapped Japanese.

China and Russia don't want to see any escalation of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Both hope that the Korean nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully. "If war were ever actually to break out, it would have a major impact on these two countries," said Jin.

In Jin's analysis it is the ROK that is in the most delicately balanced position. As he points out, "The possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK actually exerts little influence on the ROK. As a matter of fact, assuming that the DPRK did have a nuclear weapons' capability, the ROK would automatically become a nuclear power should reunification of north and south Korea be achieved. So the ROK stresses that the only way of resolving the Korean nuclear crisis is by peaceful means."

"What most concerns the ROK is to narrow the gap between the north and south by means of peaceful development and economic aid, so as to set the scene for a future reunification," said Jin.

(China.org.cn by Li Jingrong and Shao Da, February 23, 2004)