The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China recently issued five decrees on personnel, which included the open selection of cadres, en bloc voting for appointments by members of Party committees, competition for Party posts and forced resignation for malpractice.

Designed to improve democracy within the Party and strengthen the supervision of cadres, these decrees will set the stage for further reform within the system.

In my opinion, the success of the new decrees hinges on breakthroughs in the Party's philosophies and practices when selecting and appointing cadres.

The Party has been adhering to a "Party in charge of cadres" principle since its foundation more than eight decades ago. But to press ahead with the personnel reform, we need to have a renewed understanding of the perennial theory.

The principle holds that the Party is the vanguard of the working class and is capable to selecting competent elites to work for the people. The theory created excellent results during times of war and the centralized economy era.

However, the country's political, economic and cultural infrastructure has changed dramatically with the rapid development of the market system.

The change is a new test to the rationale of and practices derived by the "Party in charge of cadres" tenet.

In a country of the people, every policy should be made for the people. Fostering democracy is the intrinsic goal of the Party, and its elitist nature is in leading, organizing and supporting the people to be their own masters, rather than taking sole charge of everything.

The grave situation of corruption has proven that the use of power is a two-edged sword. People in power can work for the well-being of the public or alternatively, plunder the people and handicap the nation.

The new times call for the innovative development of the "Party in charge of cadres" principle. As the report of the Party's 16th national congress pointed out: "To foster socialist democratic politics, it is most fundamental to integrate the Party's leadership, the autonomy of the people and the rule of law in an organic way."

While adhering to the principle, we must combine it with new elements to make it better embody the trends of the times.

In a decree on the selection and appointment of Party and government agency leaders, issued in 2002, the Party's central committee set up several key criteria to assess cadres, such as a combination of both merit and virtue, acceptance by the people and results of their performance.

To breathe real power into the decree, it is particularly important to highlight the criterion of acceptance of the people.

Past experience has proven only cadres who are accepted by the people can win public support for their work and implement the Party's policies and lines effectively.

Therefore, the "Party in charge of cadres" principle must be integrated with the public's will.

Compared to the economic restructuring that has touched on the core of ownership system, the nation's political reform is lagging behind. It is not uncommon in some places that the appointment of cadres is controlled by a small group or even an individual.

The situation must be eliminated through the Party's personnel reform.

The case of Li Zhen, the former chief of the State Taxation Bureau in the northern province of Hebei who was executed late last year for amassing more than 10 million yuan (US$1.2 million) through embezzlement and taking bribes, is thought-provoking.

Why was Li, with meagre political prowess and a poor public reputation, promoted from an ordinary cadre to such an important post within a short time of only seven years?

Li's case prompted the major question: When exercising the "Party in charge of cadres" principle, who or what is supposed to have the final say when determining the recommendations and appointments of cadres?

Is it the standing committees, the Party secretaries during their working conferences, or those who are in charge? Or should the decisions be open to a wider group of people?

Without a clear answer to the questions, the situation where the minority has the final say will not change -- neither will the "Party in charge of cadres" principle be implemented correctly.

The Party's central committee has displayed its resolve by introducing en bloc voting within Party committees.

By extending the personnel power of standing committees to all Party committee members, the new policy is a revolution for making decisions about personnel and a key step toward the proper allocation and sound supervision of power.

Another symptom of the present personnel system is that voting for leading officials in Party and government agencies is, in effect, equivalent to direct appointments. The lack of transparency and public involvement has made the system open to irregularities.

Leading officials are elected. However, in some cases the election has only one candidate, and sometimes there is no competition even in pre-election procedures such as recommendation, assessment and nomination.

Therefore, the election is covert -- sometimes being controlled by a few people. It is no surprise that some officials can bribe their way through a political career.

The election of leaders in Party and government agencies needs to be reformed, but the best way to proceed is a quandary.

On the one hand, candidates must be nominated by voting Party members. But on the other hand, they must be the ones to conform to the requirements of upper-level Party organizations.

It would no doubt make Party members ask: "Shall I just exercise my right as a voter, or fulfil my obligation to tow the organization's line?"

The grass-roots practice of public nomination and election of Party and government officials seems to make some sense in this regard.

In some places, candidates wanting to become officials are nominated directly by the public and they then compete in an election.

The public nomination practice used to be limited to townships, but some provinces like East China's Jiangsu have begun introducing it to elect county officials, and the posts open to public recommendation include not only deputies but also chiefs.

The competitive election practice is a good way to integrate the public's will and ensure the Party is regulated, and make the appointment of cadres more open and transparent.

(China Daily June 15, 2004)