Ambassador Fu Limin (Chas Freeman) was US Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1993-1994. He is now chairman of Projects International, Inc. and co-chair of the US China Policy Foundation. He served as American Minister at Beijing from 1981 to 1984, helped open the US Liaison Office in 1973, and was the principal American interpreter during President Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing.
The following is the text of the interview (Q: Mi Alun, A: Chas Freeman).
Q-1. Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Chinese government stands for a "one China" policy, and America recognizes "one China." So what are the conflicts, if any, that exist between the two nations?
A: Our arguments over Taiwan seem to me to be primarily emotional, not rational, in nature; that is, they have to do with concerns about national dignity rather than national interests. It's hardly strange that Chinese should be impassioned about the issue of their country's territorial integrity and freedom from foreign spheres of influence, given China's experiences in much of the XIX and XX centuries. But few Americans know this history or understand its emotional force as it relates to Chinese views of the Taiwan issue. Chinese, with a different cultural heritage, likewise have trouble grasping how Americans might feel obliged, as a matter of national honor, to stand by moral commitments to prevent resolution of the Taiwan issue by force, regardless of the costs entailed in doing so. We are two very different societies, formed by unconnected historical experiences and with differing recollections of the events that shaped our relationship.
Nevertheless, Washington and Beijing have long agreed that the question of what sort of relationship ought to exist between Taiwan and the rest of China is for Chinese on either side of the Strait, not foreigners, to work out. On this, there is no real difference between us. The United States defines its interests in terms of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and has said it is willing to accept any solution that the parties can agree upon. And, while China insists on the right to use force, if necessary, it continues to strive for a negotiated solution -- one acceptable to Chinese on both sides of the Strait. So there shouldn't be much, if any, argument on this either.
Q-2. Why does America need a Taiwan Relations Act? Each administration could make its own policy for the issue, why put it into law?
A: The United States is a society based on the rule of law. Our constitution separates powers between branches of government and divides sovereignty between the national and state governments. In our complex system of checks and balances, legislation was necessary for the American people to be able to maintain "cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan," as agreed in the normalization communique.
When it considered President Carter's draft of such legislation, the US Congress amended it to reaffirm that the transfer of diplomatic recognition and relations from Taipei to Beijing had been premised "on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." To ensure that this expectation was met, the Congress also added authorization for the president to address Taiwan's defense needs even though the United States no longer recognized the government in Taipei or maintained official relations with it. In the 8/17/1982 communique, President Reagan and China's leader Deng Xiaoping made it clear that, despite our differences over these declarations in the Taiwan Relations Act, both sides consider the use of peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue to be desirable and feasible.
Q-3. Doesn't insistence by the American government on a peaceful solution for the Taiwan issue "intervene in China's internal affairs"?
A: I think that most Americans see their government's insistence on peaceful settlement as a practical requirement rather than as a legal question. The US policy is based on two important considerations -- one practical and one moral -- and a resulting political judgment. War, even if only among Chinese from the two sides of the Strait, would gravely disturb security in northeast Asia. Were Taiwan to be overrun by forces from the Chinese mainland most Americans and many Asians would see the failure of the US to counter this as a cynical default on the obligation to stand by long-standing friends; it could cause US allies around the world to question the value of their reliance on the United States. Finally, the practical result of a war in the Taiwan Strait -- however it turned out -- would be to guarantee a lengthy period of political and military hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. That is something neither Chinese nor Americans want to see happen and which we must work to prevent.
Q-4. If China decides to take military action toward a Taiwan solution, what is America going to do?
A: I think that the US and China should focus on making sure that neither country ever has to make the sorts of decisions that your question poses. It would be a huge setback for both countries' national interests were China to feel that it had run out of options for peaceful settlement. President Bush has said that, if China did attack Taiwan, the United States would do whatever it took to defend the island. It would be very hard to limit escalation in a war over Taiwan. Regardless of who "won" it, a war would devastate Taiwan, set back China's modernization, and inflict considerable pain on the United States. China and the United States would end up in a long-term state of hostility and perhaps intermittent conflict. That's why I believe it's in everyone's interest to seek a political rather than a military solution to the Taiwan problem.
Q-5. A number of American scholars and foreign affairs experts have suggested that the best option for Taiwan issue is to keep the status quo. What's the reason for this? What is your opinion?
A: Most of those making these arguments are trying to make the point that it would be unwise for Taipei to take actions, like further moves toward independence, that might leave the Chinese government with no alternative but to react militarily. Others believe that, inasmuch as the cross-Strait consensus on "one China" has broken down and no negotiated solution to the problem of Taiwan's relationship to the rest of China is likely soon, the least worst solution for the time being is no solution. My own view is that, awkward and frustrating as it is, the status quo -- international recognition of one China with Taiwan's substantive relationship to it left to be resolved by time and negotiation -- is better for all concerned than unilateral attempts by either side to change it would be. Of course, agreement by both sides to a mutually acceptable resolution would be better yet.
Q-6. If Taiwan and the Mainland are united now, what new challenges may Sino-American relations face?
A: My own view is that, far from challenging Sino-American relations, reunification, if it were achieved peacefully and by mutual agreement across the Strait, would be very beneficial for all concerned. It would remove the only potential cause of conflict between the US and China, eliminate the major security threat to Chinese on both sides of the Strait, and promote the peaceful development the Asia-Pacific region. It would be a peace in which many would gain and no one would lose.
As I read it, China's proposal for reunification would leave Taiwan's armed forces intact and continue to make them, rather than the People's Liberation Army, primarily responsible for Taiwan's defense. The PLA would not garrison Taiwan. This, it seems to me, nicely addresses concern by China's northeast Asian neighbors and the United States about the possible impact of reunification on regional security balances and strategic geography. Similarly, as I understand it, the Chinese proposal would allow Taiwan to continue to choose its own leaders through elections and would not assign any government personnel to the island from the mainland. Taiwan's newly democratized political system would not be affected by reunification.
These are such minimal terms for reunification that one can understand the skepticism, even suspicion, with which many in Taiwan and some in my own country have viewed them. But I am sure that negotiators could identify ways to instill confidence in these and other elements of the proposed reunification of Taiwan with the mainland under the "one country, two systems" formula and to back them with credible guarantees. If the people of Taiwan have other ideas, objections, or suspicions, they can address these more effectively at the negotiating table, it seems to me, than anywhere else.
Q-7. China is now a WTO member. In addition to economy and trade, what else might have an impact on US-China relations? Many developing nations have not become more developed by membership in WTO. China is confident that it can in this regard. What is your view?
The full normalization of China's trading and investment relations with the world, including the United States, through Chinese adherence to the WTO is a truly historic development. This economic normalization will make China more like the developed countries and will accelerate Chinese economic development. But normalization is a process, not an event. The process of adopting and implementing WTO norms will be difficult. China's economic partners, like the United States, will press the Chinese government to carry out its commitments even when these face serious political or economic resistance inside China. They can be expected to object strenuously to efforts by Chinese companies or local authorities to cheat. Disputes, some of them serious, are bound to flare up between China and other WTO members from time to time.
Fortunately, the WTO provides a multilateral forum for resolving disputes over trade and investment issues. This means that disputes that might be virtually unmanageable through bilateral confrontation can be resolved through legal and technical consultations. The removal of trade disputes from their current bilateral context to the multilateral framework of the WTO is likely to be a big plus for Sino-American relations overall.
Q-8. Following the 9.11 attack, some believe that US-China relations may be entering a new era (and some have said there is no substantial change). How do you view it?
A: Before 9.11, the US and China were bickering on a wide range of issues; the first half of 2001 was a very unhappy period in this regard. The discovery of a common interest in combating terrorism gave our leaders a chance to change the subject. They deserve commendation for having seized this opportunity at Shanghai. The result has been a much less negative, more cooperative tone in the relationship. But I am afraid that most serious issues between us were simply pushed aside, and no framework for resolving them has yet been worked out.
The resumption of exchanges of high-level visits between China and the United States gives us a chance to begin to resolve disputes rather than allowing them to fester out of sight. I earnestly hope that that will be the case. There is no question that both countries will be much better off if we can create a relationship in which cooperation increasingly outweighs contention.
Q-9. The Bush Administration has stated that the NMD is not aimed at China. But in the Pacific, America directly faces China. How should the Chinese understand the Bush Administration's statement?
A: At this point, national missile defense is a congeries of research and development projects and options, rather than a program, still less a reality. Until the United States has actually decided what sort of system to develop and deploy and we know what sort of capabilities that system will have, I don't think anyone can either prove or disprove the statement that NMD is not aimed at China and needn't threaten China's national security.
One of the results I hope will emerge from forthcoming high-level meetings is a more active bilateral dialogue that would enable the United States to understand and take into account legitimate Chinese concerns as it designs its strategic missile defense system. The stakes are high. If the development of new systems of missile defense is handled right, the world could be safer and more stable. If it is handled wrong, it could set off an arms race between the US and China from which both of us would emerge the loser.
Q-10. Some years ago, you described US-China relations as being "married first, then falling in love." Please explain.
A: Our two countries came together thirty years ago out of cold calculation that to do so was in our respective national interests. We didn't know much about each other at the time and much of what we thought we knew turned out to be wrong. As our association has proceeded, I think Americans and Chinese have developed genuine affection for each other. We have also had a spat or two as our relationship has grown in complexity. And we have discovered that, even when we hurt each other's feelings, we have no choice but to deal with each other. History, geography, and current world realities leave us no alternative.
(People's Daily February 8, 2002)
