A Defense Intelligence Agency internal review determined that much of the information Iraqi defectors gave to US officials could not be substantiated or was otherwise unusable, the New York Times reported on Monday, citing federal sources.

Also, some defectors from Iraq that the Iraqi National Congress had introduced to US intelligence officials gave false information about their credentials and misled interviewers about how much they knew about the Iraqi government's weapons program, said the paper.

Other Defense Department officials, who defended the arrangement between the exile group and defense intelligence agents to the Times, said US officials had already met the information with skepticism but it still helped improve awareness and helped confirm what agents already knew.

No more than one-third of the information gained from the defectors was potentially useful and many leads did not pan out, officials told the daily.

Some of the intelligence in question includes information on Iraq's suspected program for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Data provided about the Iraqi government is also doubted, the officials informed the Times.

The arrangement between the United States and the exile group, which was funded by taxpayers, may have wasted more than US$1 million, officials informed the Times, adding that they and others now question the credibility of the group's leader, Ahmad Chalabi, as well as doubt the Iraqi National Congress.

At least half a dozen defectors were debriefed by defense intelligence agents in late 2002 and early 2003, according to the daily.

(China Daily September 30, 2003)