Japan's Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, a private advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, submitted its final report on the proposed future direction of the country's security policy at the start of the month. 

The report, entitled The Vision for Future National Security and Defense Capability, deserves special attention.

It will be the basis for the Japanese government's new National Defense Program Outline due by the year's end, and in line with this outline, Tokyo will announce a five-year Mid-term Defense Build-up Program covering the fiscal period 2005 to 2009.

This will be the first revision of the National Defense Program Outline, the nation's basic defense framework since 1995.

Claiming the proliferation of ballistic missiles and terrorism as the two main threats to Japan's security, the panel's report demonstrates Tokyo's strong interest in a shift in its definition of defense.

In recent years, Japan has rapidly strengthened its military power by taking advantage of its alliance with the United States and holding high the banner of participation in international security matters.

The report naturally echoes Koizumi's emphasis on the US-Japan security alliance.

The United States is reviewing the role of its military bases in Japan in line with its plans for global troop redeployment.

The report stressed Japan should strengthen the US-Japan alliance in keeping with US military changes in order to properly respond to changing security threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It therefore urged the government to implement strategic consultation with Washington and formulate a new Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security and new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.

Faced with a new global security situation, it is fully justifiable for a country to adjust its defense strategy.

But the question for Japan is how it should respond to these new security threats and thereby promote regional and global peace in accordance with the pacifist principles of its constitution.

Although the report begins with the statement as to how Japan should seek to strengthen the US-Japan alliance while cooperating with the international community, the remainder is centered almost exclusively on the US-Japan alliance. Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond gets only a passing mention.

The US-Japan alliance obviously is, and will be, paramount.

Even some Japanese analysts pointed out Japan should not lose sight of a Japanese perspective when it comes to dealing with US realignment strategy.

To advance its security-policy goals, it is equally imperative for Japan to present its own vision on how it wants to establish security relations with other countries, particularly its Asian neighbors.

Ironically, international cooperation, which one could still find in the report, is highlighted as a primary duty of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

To satisfy the SDF's long-pursued wishes to expand its international sphere of influence, the report stressed that the SDF should be well prepared to deal with a large number of potential emergency situations or take part in various international missions.

Equipment for use in possible ground battles, a top priority during the Cold War era, should be revised drastically and streamlined or altered to meet the threats of the present age.

It postulates that Japan comprehensively improve the combat ability of its SDF, for example, the necessity of shifting the force structure of the land SDF away from artillery and tanks to an infantry-orientated one, the expansion of a long-range air transport capability for the air SDF, and for the maritime SDF, a shift from an anti-submarine warfare focus to one better geared to maritime security and ballistic-missile defense.

Regarding the overseas dispatch of the SDF, the report went so far as to call for the enactment of a permanent law to replace the special measures legislation through which responses have, to date, been made.

This clearly demonstrates Japan's long-pent desire to extend the combat area of its SDFs from its own territory to surrounding regions or those far beyond its shores.

The fact is that Japan has worked towards this end for many years.

The Japanese government's plan to send its troops to Iraq, despite strong opposition from both home and abroad, best demonstrates this.

With the US transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to Iraqis, Japan's SDF has become a component of the multinational troops stationed there. That signals Tokyo has made an important step towards its dream of expanding its international sphere of influence.

This clearly runs counter to the spirit of Japan's pacifist constitution by increasing the possibility of Japan becoming embroiled in a war or other armed conflict.

The report not only justifies the Japanese army's dispatch to Iraq, but has provided scope for further policy adjustments in the future.

Notably, it shows considerable interest in the US-advocated "pre-emptive" military strategy, while snubbing its long-held "defensive" strategy.

It proposes the SDF improve its capacity in order to respond quickly to new threats, in particular focusing on its multifunction, mobility and flexibility and working to improve its preventative strategies.

Its precondition for use of force has changed from "after being invaded by enemies" to "under threat from enemies."

As a structural reform of the SDF, this would replace the existing concept of "basic defense capability," ergo "possessing the minimum defense capability necessary as an independent state."

Furthermore, the report is noteworthy because it touches upon the issues that were implicitly considered "taboo" in past discussions of Japanese security policy.

To give a green light to the development and deployment of a US-dominated missile system, it discusses the potential need for revising Japan's decades-old principle on arms exports.

Japan's participation in Washington's ambitious missile shield program means it is likely to export some weapons or their parts to the United States.

This will no doubt contravene the country's long-held ban on the export of weapons.

Japan's post-war pacifist constitution, adopted in 1967, explicitly enshrines principles banning arms exports to foreign countries.

Some Japanese media questioned how Japan's philosophy as a pacifist state can be maintained if the prohibition on arms exports is relaxed.

In addition, the report mentions the constitutional problem as an issue that should be further studied. It urges that discussion of matters, such as the extent to which the exercise of collective self-defense is permissible under the present constitutional framework, be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible.

The report once again expressed particular concerns over China's activities in the sea around Japan, especially oceanographic survey vessels and China's normal military exercises.

It called on the Japanese government and its people to consider whether China's military exercises have rendered Japan's self-defense capability ineffective.

The Japanese government's attempts to dodge international criticism of its own military upgrade by deliberately exaggerating the military strength of other countries, cannot conceal its own military ambitions.

As an influential country in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has the right to play a military role in the international community.

But this should be subject to constitutional and international legal constraints.

The concept enshrined in the report, the backbone of its new defense outline, is essentially a shift in the country's strategic mentality from defensive to offensive.

Given Japan's lack of soul-searching over its history of aggression, coupled with its following in the footsteps of Washington's pre-emptive attack strategy, the country's defense development, no matter under what guise, will give rise to deep concerns among its Asian neighbors.

(China Daily October 26, 2004)