By Tao Wenzhao

US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited China on October 18-20. It was the first such visit by the US Defence Secretary since President George W. Bush took office in 2001 and aroused attention, especially because Rumsfeld is known as a hardliner in the Bush administration.

Sino-US relations have been through ups and downs since Bush took over the White House, but things have improved since the September 11 tragedy.

But bilateral military relations have lagged behind with only fleeting visits and exchanges which do not have much substance. Rumsfeld's passive attitude contributed to the problem.

Bush, during the Shanghai APEC meeting in October 2001, expressed his wish to promote bilateral military relations. In May 2003, Rumsfeld met Hu Jintao, then vice-president, during the latter's visit to the United States. The Chinese Minister of Defence Cao Gangchuan visited the United States in November 2003, but Rumsfeld took until last month to come to China.

He put forward three conditions for military exchanges: transparency, consistency and reciprocity. In the words of some US scholars, he raised the threshold, knowing that China would not be able to cross it and then he could pass the blame on to the Chinese side. He insisted on visiting headquarters of China's strategic missiles during his October visit.

It seemed there were three reasons for Rumsfeld's indifference: First, he had misgivings about China's economic growth, military development and strategic intentions, which were manifest in his Defence Ministry's reports on China military power and in his June speech in Singapore - a shared view among hawks in the Bush administration. Second, the aircraft clash over Hainan on April 1, 2001 led to the deterioration of military ties between the two countries. Third, the Taiwan question means it was possible to embroil both countries in a military conflict even though the possibility was remote.

But Rumsfeld came, after all, just like all the senior officials in the Bush administration. The president himself will embark on his China trip on November 19.

Although Rumsfeld's meetings with Chinese leaders were peppered with accusations and strong tones, he said he must have a dialogue with China and get along with it. Exchanges can help remove the sense of "mystery," he said, and would facilitate understanding towards each other, locating areas of common interest and increasing co-operation on crucial international matters. All this was a step forward from his previous speeches and positions.

People can change. For example, the former defence minister of India George Fernandez used to be an advocate of the "China threat," but since his 2003 visit here, he speaks of China's reform and opening-up policy, promoting Indians' understanding of China.

Another example is Paul Wolfowitz, a representative of America's neo-conservative camp. In a 1997 debate on China policy, the then researcher in the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies advocated "containment of China," among other words of hyperbole. He even said that China, in 20-30 years, would pose a threat to Western democracies just as Nazi Germany did. He was the second-hand man in the Defence Ministry during Bush's first term and a promoter for pre-emptive strikes, and he is now the World Bank president.

In an interview in mid-October in China, he said he would not equate China now with the Germany or Japan then. He said China's rise would be very different from those two countries and the history of World War II would not be repeated.

He maintained that China's influence would only increase and it would be important that China uses this influence in a constructive manner. He clarified that he had sufficient reasons to believe that China would do that. This position shows a sharp contrast to before.

James Lily, a former US Ambassador to China, is another case in point. He was in Beijing during the 1989 incident and, for a long time after that, held a tough stance towards China. His think tank, the American Enterprise Institute, is also known for its conservatism. But later on, he started to change. During my recent trips to the United States, I paid visits to him and sensed his change in attitude. In an interview with a Taiwan television reporter last December, he explicitly said that America's China policy is "one China" and the United States has never acknowledged Taiwan as a sovereign and independent nation.

Of course it should not be expected that Rumsfeld will change his attitude towards China through one visit. As a matter of fact, I believe that, during the course of China's development, some Americans will have doubts about China's strategic intentions and will have debates on that subject. This should be seen as normal for the bilateral relationship.

But the facts will enlighten us. Engagement is better than isolation. Through engagement there can be more understanding and less "mystique" and both sides will adjust policies that will be more and more aligned with the reality.

The author is a researcher with the Institute of American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

(China Daily November 14, 2005)