US victory in Afghanistan hinges on locals

By Matthew Rusling

Winning the fight in Afghanistan depends on U.S. forces' ability to win over the local population, a U.S. expert has said.

"There's an old saying in counterinsurgency warfare -- It's necessary to win the hearts and minds," Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, told Xinhua in a recent interview.

Indeed, the sentiment is integral to executing U.S. President Barack Obama's new strategy, the first major test of which began earlier this month when 4,000 troops converged on the country's Helmand province.

The short-term strategy is to ramp up security there -- one of the country's most volatile areas -- and ensure that the August presidential elections go smoothly.

In the long term, it aims to boost the economy and improve the lives of those living in one of the world's most impoverished nations, said Krepinevich. Increased economic opportunities will prevent locals from joining the Taliban, the theory goes.

"The population provides the enemy with intelligence, with supplies, with recruits," said the expert. "But if you can win the population over to your side, you get the intelligence, you get the recruits ... If you win the people over, the Taliban can't win. "

Critics said that Afghans are losing patience with U.S. forces, who have been at war there for the better part of a decade. Indeed, gaining Afghan trust could take years, even decades, they said. And time may be running out, as some U.S. lawmakers signaled they want to see progress by next year.

Krepinevich, however, said that Congress will give President Obama the time he needs if members see progress.

"One of the things that really hurt the Bush administration in Iraq was the sense that, after one year, after two years, people weren't seeing any progress," he said. "People were actually seeing things get worse instead of better."

One area where U.S. forces could make inroads is the agricultural sector. Currently, one of Afghanistan's major crops is poppies, from which narcotics such as heroin -- illegal in many countries -- are derived.

"If you can begin to develop an alternative economic model instead of the poppy crop ... you can enable farmers to make a living," said the expert, noting that doing so would replace terrorism with economic growth.

Just substituting one crop for another is apparently not enough. It is also crucial to develop infrastructure -- roads and transportation, for example -- that can help farmers bring their crops to urban markets.

"There's a whole series of events that have to take place," he said. "It's not just switching from one crop to another."

Non-governmental organizations are working to solve this problem, but troops can help in places too dangerous for civilians.

"A clever use of some military transportation might be to say ' look, I'm going to give you my trucks. We'll help you move this stuff to market,'" he said.

Vehicles carrying poppies now traverse smuggling routes established by the Taliban and its allies, he said. But a new marketing and distribution system must be set up.

Roads must also be repaired, as many have been damaged by improvised explosive devices that the Taliban planted. The new strategy also aims to reduce civilian casualties. General Stanley McCrystal, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, recently instructed U.S. forces to balance the need for air support with avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage.

"It's more important to win the confidence of the people than to win a battle against the Taliban," Krepinevich said.

Understanding locals' view of the conflict is critical, the military expert said. Afghans have a keen sense of who has real power and will switch teams in mid conflict to be on the winning side, Krepinevich said.

While in their hearts they may side with anyone who can offer them education and development -- what U.S. forces say they will do -- they will support the Taliban if the organization is able to coerce their neighbors. Experts said this is a typical practice in a country where the desire to save one's family and personal interests trumps ideology.

But critics said that just cajoling Taliban foot soldiers to cross over to the U.S. side is not enough, and that economic incentives must be set up to encourage them to do so.

In an article entitled "Flipping the Taliban" by Fotini Christia and Michael Semple published in Foreign Affairs, the authors noted that the government in Iraq put 100,000 Sunnis on its payroll for about 300 dollar a month. The same could be done in Afghanistan for about 120 U.S. dollars per month per insurgent, they said.

Krepinevich said that in the end, replacing U.S. troops with Afghan forces -- and doing it soon -- is crucial. While Afghans are grateful for the heightened security, they know U.S. troops must eventually leave.

"We can buy time for them -- to equip them and train them -- but in the end it is going to have to be Afghans defending Afghans, " he said.

Noting that Afghan troops are lacking in number and skills, which remains a source of frustration for the United States, Krepinevich said that with U.S. forces heavily involved in Iraq, there was little emphasis on standing up Afghan units until recently.

While that is beginning to change, it remains unknown when Afghan forces can take over security. The speed at which they become ready is actually a key indicator of progress.

"If you want to look at something that is going to make a difference over the next 12 to 18 months, ask yourself whether the number of Afghan forces is increasing and what kind of a job are they doing," the defense expert said.

(Xinhua News Agency July 25, 2009)