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Gaza crisis: same battle, graver consequences

By Jin Liangxiang: 0 Comment(s)Print E-mail China.org.cn, November 19, 2012

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More a hindrance [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]

The Middle East in the last few years has witnessed the Iraq war, the Iran nuclear issue and the Syrian crisis. Analysts therefore believed that the Palestinian issue, overshadowed by these hotspots, will no longer be important as it used to be. However, the violence last week in the Gaza Strip has disproved this theory. The Palestinian issue, far from marginalized, still touches the vulnerable nerves of the region.

According to analysts, Israel has many reasons to intensify the violence at this very particular moment. Firstly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak believe military action will strengthen their positions in the country's elections scheduled for January.

Barak Ravid argued in Haaretz that just as the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the commander of the 9/11 attacks, gave an election boost to U.S. President Barack Obama, closing accounts with (Ahmed) Jabari, the chief military command and the abductor of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, is a key campaign strategy for Netanyahu and Barak.

Secondly, by escalating tensions, Netanyahu intends to disturb Palestine Authority's plan to join in the UN as a full member, which Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, had invested tremendous effort in.

Thirdly, Israel intends to interrupt the process of a new Palestinian investigation into the cause of Yassir Arafat's death. Palestinians believe that Arafat was poisoned to death by Israelis after Swiss experts found radioactive polonium-210 on his personal effects in August of this year.

Despite these reasons, Israel's "pillar of defense" operation follows the logic of its national retaliation strategy, its internal politics and Netanyahu's personal style. As an arch hawk, Netanyahu's government has been hyper-sensitive to any perceived threat, over-inclined to use force to settle its conflicts.

However, regional conditions have changed greatly as the story of violence repeats itself. Four years ago, while Israel was operating "Cast Lead" in Gaza Strip, Hosni Mubarak's Egypt closed the only passage that connects Gaza and the outside world. Gazans could do nothing other than hopelessly cry for help in their isolated territory.

Meanwhile, Egypt has not hidden its support for its Arab brothers in Gaza. Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi called back his ambassador to Tel Aviv, and sent his prime minister to Gaza in a show of solidarity with Hamas, in sharp contrast with his ousted predecessor. Morsi, meanwhile, warned Israel of a "high price" for continued military operations in the coastal enclave.

According to reports, the Tunisian foreign minister also visited Gaza on Nov. 17 to express empathy for the Palestinians, in response to Israel's military action.

These displays point to a new kind of regional politics and diplomacy as a result of the Arab Spring. It is true that historically, Egypt and Tunisia have shown support for a Palestinian state. Both the new governments of Egypt and Tunisia are of strong backers of the Muslin Brotherhood, which has strong ties with Hamas.

Such changes also reflect shifting political conditions in the region. Shortly after taking power, all these Islamic parties have to face the same task of enhancing their legitimacy. Support for Palestinian statehood has provided them a rare opportunity to gain domestic favor. Previously, these parties could only rely on efforts to rebuild their countries' economies to curry favor; the effects of such reconstruction are rarely visible in the short term.

Even though they have not gained much attention in the press, the Palestinian question and ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict have always remained basic elements that have defined Middle East politics. For many in the Arab world, the future of Palestine and question of defending the Palestinian people will be a key reminder of what it means to be Arab and Muslim.

The implications of recent events will also be tremendous. Firstly, it will prove to be a detriment, if not a disaster for Israel's diplomatic efforts. With its sophisticated weaponry, there is no doubt that Israel will win a decisive victory as it did in 2008. But the crisis will significantly undermine the structure of Israel's diplomatic relations built in the last three decades. It is expected that not only Egypt but also Jordan, the only two countries having diplomatic relations with Israel, will limit their ties.

Secondly, it might divert the global attention from other major regional issues. If the world focuses on Gaza, global attention on the Syrian crisis and the Iran nuclear issue might decrease significantly. Hence, Bashar Assad might get time to recollect his strength, and Iran might feel emboldened to accelerate its nuclear program.

Thirdly, the conflict will pose challenges for new Arab regimes. Though those like Morsi's Egyptian regime might be able to enhance their legitimacy by standing with Gaza, they do not have sufficient economic and military resources to invest in the conflict. If the situation gets worse, they might face growing domestic dissatisfaction.

Fourthly, this incident will greatly enhance Hamas's authority in Palestine. The Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East, whatever reasons they occur for, installed into power Islamic parties which are generally considered to be unfavorable to Israel. These parties' support for Hamas will further increase the legitimacy and strength of Hamas as a Palestinian faction. This will mean a profound change of Palestinian political structure, which was previously dominated by the Abbas and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/jinliangxiang.htm

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