What do the Japanese want?

By Tim Collard
0 Comment(s)Print E-mail China.org.cn, December 31, 2012
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[By Jia Qiang/China.org.cn]

[By Jia Qiang/China.org.cn]

As the world is aware, Japan recently elected a new government, which campaigned on an openly nationalist platform. New Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed to strengthen Japan's geopolitical position in East Asia and in the world as a whole. He plans to do this by reaffirming the U.S.-Japan alliance and launching a major diplomatic initiative focussing on the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship. The intention here is to solicit U.S. backing for a firm stand on Japan's various disputes with China.

But the new Japanese government may have miscalculated here. The wish of the U.S. for a strong strategic partnership with Japan is undoubtedly sincere; but this will not cover automatic endorsement of unnecessary provocations in the region. In particular, Mr Abe is wasting his time if he thinks that his U.S. visit will succeed in eliciting a firm U.S. commitment to supporting Japan's claim to the Diaoyu Islands. The US's strategy revolves around maintaining a balance of forces in the region and in heading off potential clashes.

And the U.S. is not unaware that some very disturbing currents have emerged in Japanese politics in the context of the recent elections. Abe has spoken of "protecting every inch of Japan's sacred land and sea", making it clear that he includes the Diaoyu Islands, annexed by Japan in 1895, in that ambit; this kind of language does not only threaten a clash with China, it also carries echoes of a war in which thousands of Americans died fighting against "sacred" Japanese territorial claims. Japanese political parties may be able to appeal to this kind of sentiment in the pursuit of votes at home; the idea that it will ever obtain any sort of endorsement from the USA is, frankly, bizarre.

The Japanese government must know this. They must know that, in the days of the information superhighway, they cannot give one message to a domestic audience and another to a foreign audience and expect not to be found out. China, in particular, will be keen to know just how much of this rhetoric really needs to be taken seriously. In order to address this need, Prime Minister Abe is sending Masahiko Komura, former foreign minister and senior government envoy, to visit China in early January to hold paragovernmental talks with State Councillor Dai Bingguo.

The Japanese are not stupid. They know that a long-term accommodation will have to be made with China; the key issue now is preparing the ground for this accommodation, so that Japan can negotiate from as strong a position as possible. Clearly that will depend on a Japanese economic revival – on making up some of the ground lost in the last twenty years of relative decline. After all, Abe's main priority is not foreign policy but getting a firm grip on the weakened economy. I would guess, therefore, that the current blowing of trumpets is aimed at ensuring that not too much geopolitical ground is lost to China before the Japanese economic revival is in place. Without that basis, there is no particular reason for anyone – including the USA – to pay much attention to Japan's political posturing, particularly in cases where unpleasant ghosts from the pre-1945 period are raised.

Japan's negotiating position is not strong. China will just sit tight on her existing positions and wait for the Japanese to play the first card. It is clear that neither side is going to make any concessions on the competing territorial claims. All Japan has produced so far is a certain amount of foreign-policy bluster to cover the essential weakness of her position; all countries have had recourse to this trick at one time or another, and it simply has to be discounted. Japan knows that, unless her economy is fixed, she is not going to regain the predominant position she once held. Until then, even though Japan is in formal alliance with the USA and China is not, everybody knows that it is China whose interests have to be considered first in the region.

Japan has only one real card to play, and a dangerous one. One of Abe's pledges was to re-define Japanese defence policy to cover a much more active military strategy, throwing off some of the restrictions imposed after 1945. The U.S. would probably not object to this, and – surprisingly perhaps – there are signs that smaller countries in the region, such as the Philippines, might not object either. It is vital that this issue is handled with due regard for each nation's security needs, and that nobody over-reacts to any moves made by others. In particular, China and Japan must be flexible in recognising each other's legitimate needs and aspirations. It's not about one side inflicting defeats on the other. Security is not a zero-sum game. But, as a former diplomat, I do not envy those who have the job of drafting Mr Komura's brief.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/timcollard.htm

Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.

 

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