Turbulent history taints Turkish tactics
- By Jin Liangxiang
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E-mail China.org.cn, May 14, 2012
Turkey's recent activism in major regional issues including the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Iran nuclear issue, and involvement in the political turmoil engulfing the Arab world is symbolic of its neo-Ottomanism, which is the essence of its new ideological approach to foreign policy. Turkey has risen to global prominence as a major Muslin state in the Middle East. But there is little evidence so far to suggest that Turkey's influence can spread beyond this sphere.
Neo-Ottomanism is the latest result of Turkey's efforts to redefine its national identity following the ending of the Cold War, and to realign its foreign policy orientation after the failure of its Pan-Turkism movements, both post-Cold War and following its failure to join the European Union at the turn of the 21st Century.
Publicly, Turkey's leaders present Turkey as a modern state favoring equal relations with its regional neighbors. But, via neo-Ottomanism, Turkey not only means to promote greater engagement with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire, but also to play a leading role in regional affairs and to orchestrate matters on the political stage of the Middle East.
The Palestinian issue is one of the areas in which Turkey has invested significantly in terms of its neo-Ottomanist diplomacy. On January 29, 2009, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out of the Davos Forum after an argument with Israeli President Shimon Peres following Israel's Operation Cast Lead, from December 27, 2008 - January 18, 2009, in the Gaza Strip. This action immediately cemented Erdogan's image as a hero in the Arab and Muslim world.
Turkey also gained a lot of prestige as the protector of Palestinian interests following its diplomacy in the aftermath of the Flotilla incident. Turkey strongly backed the humanitarian efforts of international NGOs to break through the Gaza blockade, which finally resulted in Israel's raiding of "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" on May 31, 2010.
The so-called Arab Spring is another major area in which Turkey has invested greatly in terms of its new diplomacy. Turkey's experience in modern state building has provided a mature model for the social and political transition and transformation of Muslim countries. This experience has also become a source of Turkey's soft power and capital for its involvement in the Middle East political crisis.
Turkey had vigorously supported the international isolation of Qaddafi's regime in Libya, which greatly contributed to the eventual collapse of Qaddafi's regime. Turkey has also provided a safe harbor for the Syrian National Council (SNC), one of the three major factions of Syria's political opposition, and has also provided major sponsorship for the SNC. On April 1, Turkey hosted the second Friends of Syria conference in Istanbul.
Despite all these efforts, there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that Turkey's new diplomacy and engagement have been universally accepted in the Arab world. For instance, Egypt refused both Erdogan's request to deliver a speech at Tahrir Square, the symbol of Egypt's revolution which saw Hosni Mubarak's rule overthrown, and his request to tour the Gaza Strip via Sinai during his visit to Egypt in September 2011. Turkey had hoped to gain the acceptance of the Arab world by expressing support both for freedom in the Arab world and for Palestinian nationhood, the common cause of the Arab and Muslim world.
Events have proved that Turkey's desire to renew its traditional sphere of influence is not shared by its near neighbors. The history of the Ottoman Empire might inspire pride and ambition among today's Turks; but it might also arouse memories of bullying, humiliation and unequal treatment by Turkey among the majority of Arabs.
Experts and analysts are even suspicious of Turkey's motives for reengaging with the Middle East. They believe that Turkey has never wavered in its determination to enter the European Union, despite its policy of Middle East diplomacy. By appeasing the Arab Middle East, Turkey really means to gain more bargaining chips for its entrance into Europe. Whether this is true or not, such questions will be an obstacle to Turkey's further engagement with the Middle East.
Turkey's ambition is also limited by two factors. The first is Turkey's geopolitical position. It seems that Turkey has always been very proud of its special geopolitical location as the gateway between both Europe and Asia and East and West. Turkey's location, far from being advantageous, is, most of the time, very much the opposite, as the country often falls between two stools. It cannot project its influence to the population center of the Middle East or to the power center of Europe.
The second factor is Turkey's limited national strength. Turkey has a population of about 70 million and a territory of 780，000 square kilometers. Though it is obviously larger and stronger than most Middle Eastern countries, its size does not allow it to play a decisive role in the region.
Turkey's experience with the Syria issue is indicative of its foreign policy dilemma. Turkey has actively engaged in Syria's domestic crisis since the beginning of anti-government hostilities. However, the joint vetoes of the two UN Security Council permanent members and the reluctance of the other three for further intervention in Syria showed Turkey that it could not influence events in Syria.
All in all, Turkey's Middle East policy is awkward. It is awkward because its ambition exceeds its actual national strength, in addition to the fact that its historic relations with the Middle East are too complicated.
The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/jinliangxiang.htm
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