Dinner with Francis Fukuyama
- By Zhang Yongle
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E-mail China.org.cn, November 24, 2012
In the early 1990s when Fukuyama was gloating about the "end of history", Wang Shaoguang had already sensed the great crisis in post-Soviet Russia brought about by Western "shock therapy". When discussing tax reform, Wang set forth four national capabilities, and expanded into eight later on. In the last two years, he expanded the list to 10. Each of these capacities bears an analytic concept of its own. This grand assessment system puts Wang's analysis on a higher plane compared to the China research done by US analysts, and has led Wang to obtain a good grasp of China's experiences in its national capacity building in the 20th century. However, Fukuyama did not mention Wang at all in his book. When I asked him whether he had received any enlightenment from Wang's research, he said "No". I think it's a pity if Fukuyama hadn't even read Wang's material.
In addition, Fukuyama's point of view on "national capabilities" seems different from Wang's understanding. I asked Fukuyama at the dinner table that if Scotland successfully became independent via public referendum, does it mean Britain has problems with its national capabilities? Fukuyama said "no", saying he thinks that it is a question of identity recognition instead of national capabilities. Then, I asked him whether the split of Yugoslavia demonstrated Yugoslavia's problem in national capabilities. To this, Fukuyama gave me a positive answer. The reason, he said, was that Yugoslavia combined together a group of regions that were reluctant to be together. So, whether or not Yugoslavia could hold them together became a question of its national capabilities. At this point, his standard seemed clearer: Separatism based on democratic procedures in democratic society does not indicate a problem of national capability, but separatism in non-democratic society is. However, in Wang's point of view, the fact that part of a country split as a result of lacking cohesion demonstrates a lack of national capability.
I tried to challenge Fukuyama's standard with the case of the secession of the southern United States from the North in the mid-19th century. About 90 percent of white voters in the South favored breaking away from the Union. Obviously, the Confederacy is in line with Fukuyama's standard for a government of accountability. As such, according to Fukuyama, we should not look at the American Civil War from the point of view that the Union lacked national capability?
Case in point: President Abraham Lincoln was a strong vindicator of national re-unification. Lincoln adopted tough, often cruel policies to suppress separatism in the South. Lincoln's justification for such behavior was to preserve the Union. Liberating the slaves was just a means to achieve this end — if the integrity of the Union could have been saved without liberating the slaves, Lincoln likely would have compromised. Judging from this evidence, Lincoln himself would not have likely agreed with Fukuyama's theory.
It seems that Fukuyama does not feel comfortable denying the relationship between the American Civil War and lack of US national capabilities. On my question about Lincoln, Fukuyama gave an adverse explanation. He thought that while maintaining integrity of the federation was the main issue on the table, Lincoln's core concern was to eliminate the slave system. I think this explanation is barely supportive. If we pay attention to Lincoln's theory, we would see that his biggest effort was focused on refuting US States' Rights, represented by John C. Calhoun and others.
Lincoln thought that all the people in all the states belonged to a unified nation, whose beginnings could be traced back to the Declaration of Independence of 1776. Lincoln, regardless of the legal fact that the colonies in North America became independently governed states in 1776, argued that the American Revolutionary War led to the conjunct sacrifice of all the colonies. He thought that it was the sacrifice, instead of the Constitution later on, which forged the unified American nation. For Lincoln, the nation could never be separated, and this had nothing to do with whether the initial Declaration of Independence was adopted by vote or not.
So, although Fukuyama is advocating "national capabilities", an analytic concept which seems neutral in value, he places this concept under the envelope of freedom-democracy standard. Maybe, for him, if a political entity friendly split in line with democratic principles, national capabilities should not be used to pinch together those who are reluctant to be together. This is traced from his book The End of History and the Last Man. This is where Fukuyama developed his core theories; he seems unable to escape from his past.
When I asked him whether Iranian Islamic democracy could accomplish the combination of national capability, rule of law and accountability, surprisingly, Fukuyama gave me a positive answer. Secularism is not a necessary element in his model. At least, his theory is not as sealed up as it was 20 years ago. He, instead, recognizes the possibility of different political models in different regions of the world. As a member of the think-tank of the US government, there is a subtle relationship between his views and US policy. The Obama Administration has distanced itself with George W. Bush's practices of nation-building in the Middle East, instead putting up with the rise of Islamic democracies. The US, comparatively recessing in strength, has to tolerate a more diversified world. To this end, the adjustment of Fukuyama's views is justified. More US scholars, I believe, will follow suit in adopting these changes.
The author is an associated professor with Law School of Peking University.
The article was published in Chinese and translated by Li Bin.
Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.
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