One thing most can agree on about the vote by the U.K. to leave the European Union (EU) on June 23, in an ill-advised referendum: It has made the economic and diplomatic future of the U.K. more complex than it was prior to this date.

Complexity is no bad thing if it leads to new opportunities. But in order to get the best out of them, one usually needs a strategy. The U.K. in terms of trade negotiations has largely outsourced its work with China to the EU. After exiting the Union in the next two years or beyond, it will need to stand on its own. Does it have the ability, and the will, to seek a better quality investment and trade relationship with China?

In a sense, under the former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, that was what it was already seeking. The U.K. took the lead in proactively joining the China-founded Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank in early 2015, despite U.S. misgivings. With the state visit by President Xi Jinping to the U.K. in October that year a raft of new investments were announced. The most eye-catching of these was GBP 6 billion in a new nuclear power station in the west of England. Some started talking of a "golden age" between the two countries.

The new Prime Minister, Mrs. May, in requesting a review pause before delivering final judgment on whether the nuclear deal can go ahead in early August has signaled that the momentum that was building up is being toned down. Some of her advisors have talked about China in more traditional terms - as a country with different values and different security concerns, which the U.K. has to be wary of.

There is an inherent contradiction here. Prior to deciding to leave the EU, the U.K. was in a far less exposed position than now. It's chef trading and economic partners, mostly within the EU, existed in a situation of relative security, U.K. growth looked good, and predictions were that, as long as it navigated the Brexit referendum well and people opted to stay in the Union, that it would maintain steady growth for the foreseeable future. In such a context, the U.K. could just as well have decided to take no risks with its relations with China, and leave things as they are, maintaining the status quo. That it chose to seek an upgraded relationship was mostly due to the personal interest of Osborne.

Under May, the U.K., post the decision to Brexit, is in a situation of much greater uncertainty. It will need to restructure its relations with the EU, doing what it can to preserve its key economic alliances with the single market, but it will also need to seek further afield for new partnerships which will compensate for what it might lose once it leaves the settled framework of the EU. It is in this situation, rather than the one prior to June 23, that the U.K. might want to take chances, go for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with new partners and experiment.

May's decision shows however that the U.K. government, at the moment at least, is extremely cautious. She is unwilling to take any chances until things are a little more certain. In many ways, the government did not expect the vote on the EU to go the way it has, and are still slightly bewildered. This delay symbolizes that.

Whether or not the nuclear deal eventually gets the go ahead, the next step will be to ask how, and in what form, the U.K. might want to approach getting more quality investment and economic support from China. It will certainly want to maintain the strong financial role of London, already a major center for RMB trading. Brexit threatens this at the moment by potentially removing what are called its passporting rights - the ability to undertake financial service work across the single market area.

The U.K. will also have to promote its technology companies aggressively in China, and give much more help in making British companies seek opportunities there. At the moment, only 1 percent of U.K. outward investment goes to China, a figure largely unchanged for two decades. Moreover, the U.K. runs a large trade deficit with the PRC. Both of these figures will need to change in the U.K.'s favor, and change fast.

The simple answer would be to go quickly for U.K.-China FTA. This at least would give Britain a competitive advantage over the rest of the EU which currently does not have one. But there are many problems here. Firstly, the U.K. cannot start to negotiate a deal till it has effectively left the Union, something unlikely for the next two or more years. Secondly, even if an FTA is signed, all this supplies is a framework for business. Businesses then need to go and take up the opportunities available. That could prove hard work. Finally, the U.K. will need to demonstrate its attractiveness as trade, technology and investment partners to China post-Brexit. It will need to show that it has been strengthened, not weakened, by this process, and has become more, not less, attractive.

The most one can conclude at the moment is that, in a very short space of time, the U.K. has gone from being a stable partner to China (and the rest of the world), seeking incremental and manageable improvements to its position, to one that has been forced into a situation of potential vulnerability and uncertainty. As the Financial Times said immediately after the referendum on June 23, scarcely, in peace times at least, can a government in a stable, developed country have ever made such a reckless decision. The priority of the government now is to at least create a little more clarity and stability. Creating good relations with China will be part of that.

Kerry Brown is professor of Chinese studies and director of the Lau China Institute, King's College, London, and associate fellow, Chatham House, London, on the Asia Programme.

Opinion article reflected the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.

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